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Dear Future
Abstract
The bodies have been buried. There was no retaliation. The soldiers have been withdrawn from the streets
of Belfast but on every corner the ghosts of the dead remain stranded until their features fade with
memory. The odd British army helicopter, of course, still carries out surveillance. The border is still
patrolled. Some militants, stranded with the ghosts of comrades, embittered or hurt too much, still
imagine circumstances where the old struggle can be replicated. Some unionists, bitter, intransigent, also
hurt, recalling their dead, still indulge in the dream of stopping the clock, or better still, turning it back.
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DANNY MORRISON

Dear Future
There will be reel_ then there will be black -Fred 0' Aguiar

The bodies have been buried. There was no retaliation. The soldiers have
been withdrawn from the streets of Belfast but on every corner the ghosts of
the dead remain stranded until their features fade with memory.
The odd British army helicopter, of course, still carries out surveillance.
The border is still patrolled. Some militants, stranded with the ghosts of
comrades, embittered or hurt too much, still imagine circumstances where
the old struggle can be replicated. Some unionists, bitter, intransigent, also
hurt, recalling their dead, still indulge in the dream of stopping the clock, or
better still, turning it back.
It is October the 1st, 1998, and today the Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams
has had his third meeting with the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, David
Trimble. This is progress. Even if they havent agreed. They were attempting
to sort out the issue of decommissioning of IRA weapons - the very
contentious issue over which the first phase of the peace process and the
first IRA ceasefire back in 1994 broke down. Trimble, now the First Minister
in the new northern Assembly as a result of the extraordinary political
developments this year, is refusing to form a multiparty executive which
includes Sinn Fein or set-up cross-border executive bodies until the IRA
agrees a timetable and verification process. No such requirement from Sinn
Fein - other than a pledge to use its influence to bring decommissioning
about- is in the Belfast Agreement signed on Good Friday. In fact, Trimble
lost that argument of linkage back then. But it is the latest crisis and it has
the potential to once again de-rail all the progress to date. But let us go back.
Let us see how we arrived at this point. What sort of a year has it been. Has
peace won the war?
British army helicopters have been in the sky above Belfast almost
continuously since 1971 when the IRA launched its armed struggle; apart
from Christmases, that is, when the combatants like civilized beings
observed unofficial ceasefires. In mid-July 1998 the helicopters were,
unusually, not above the skies of republican districts in Belfast looking out
for possible dissident IRA activity but were monitoring working-class
unionist areas for gangs of loyalists roaming the streets, setting up illegal
roadblocks, rioting and hijacking vehicles. In several towns loyalist
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paramilitaries (mostly associated with the Loyalist Volunteer Force, the LVF)
were throwing grenades at, and opening fire on, their allies - members of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the RUC), 90% of whom are from the
Protestant community, and on British soldiers. In the same period ten rural
Catholic churches and several schools were destroyed in arson attacks, and
Catholic families were petrol-bombed from their homes in mixed areas. It
was all so reminiscent- the past as our future.
The immediate cause of the trouble was the decision of the Parades
Commission to ban Orangemen from marching from Drumcree Church of
Ireland graveyard through Garvaghy Road, the Catholic quarter of
Portadown, a town 40 miles outside of Belfast. Annually, the Orangemen
celebrate the victory of the Dutch William of Orange over the Catholic heir
to the English throne, James IT, in 1690, fought on Irish soil. The indigenous
Irish supported James: the English and Scottish settlers of the Ulster
Plantation supported William. As a result of the ban several thousand
Orangemen camped on the hillside at Drumcree, determined that they
would get their way.
The Parades Commission was established in law by the British
government to independently adjudicate on the controversial marching issue
after the unrest in 1997. The British government had banned certain marches
in the past but then disgracefully reversed its decisions when loyalists
threatened and used widespread violence, including assassinating innocent
Catholics. Nationalists were then batoned off their own streets to allow the
Orangemen to march, leaving nationalists angry at being treated as secondclass citizens, almost 30 years after the founding of the civil rights
movement.
The difference between 1997 and 1998 is that last May people in both parts
of Ireland in two referenda voted for the Belfast Agreement, an agreement
which was negotiated by most of the political parties over a period of
months and signed on Good Friday. The votes in the North (the Six
Counties) was 70% in favour. For the first time in 75 years Sinn Fein, which
is associated with the IRA, took part in the negotiations, their inclusion
having been secured by the renewal of the IRAs ceasefire in July 1997.
The main points of the Agreement were: the establishment of an elected
Assembly in the North with a power-sharing Executive representative of
both communities, and the emplacement of cross-border and all-Ireland
bodies to deal with social and economic matters; Southern Ireland would
relinquish its territorial claim over the North; that the Dublin government
and the nationalist community accept that there will be no change in the
(British) constitutional status of the North without the consent of a majority
(thus giving the unionists the assurances they have been requiring); that
political prisoners belonging to those organizations observing ceasefires
would be released within two years; and that both communities would be
recognized as having equal rights.
The Agreement also says that the Assembly and the Executive can only
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function if they enjoy the support of a majority in both communities.
Furthermore, they can only function if the all-Ireland and cross-border
bodies (their third tier) that deal with social and economic matters are also
facilitated and supported by the Assembly. While Sinn Fein places great
store in these bodies the unionists, from Trimble to Paisley, have major
problems with their all-Ireland nature, and have expressed fears that these
are the first step to a united Ireland.
A close examination of the referendum vote in the North and the share of
the seats in Junes Assembly elections reveals that unionists are split virtually
down the middle over the Agreement. In the referendum the unionist
community voted 31.12% Yes. But 28.88% of them voted No, against the
recommendation of the leader of the mainstream Ulster Unionist Party,
David Trimble, who is by no means noted for his moderation. In fact,
Trimble became party leader in 1995 for being identified with the Orange
victory at that years Drumcree when the British government capitulated to
their demands to march through Garvaghy Road. In June, just over 30 proAgreement unionists were elected, including two from loyalist paramilitary
parties on ceasefire, as opposed to 25 anti-Agreement candidates under a
coalition led by the old man of sectarian politics, the fundamentalist
preacher, Ian Paisley.
The siege at Drumcree in 1998 was being used by Paisley and the Orange
Order to try and subvert the Agreement and undermine Trimble. Paisley
said, This is a battle that has to be won. No ifs. No buts. For nationalists it
had become a litmus test of whether the Agreement and the new
dispensation could deliver them from the sectarian triumphalism which has
been a hallmark of the Six-County state since its inception. If nationalists are
no longer second-class citizens then the Orangemen require their consent to
march through their district just as, in the bigger picture, nationalists accept
that there will not be a British withdrawal and a re-united Ireland without
the consent of the unionists.
In Portadown the Orange Order refused to negotiate with the Catholic
residents for two reasons. One, they insisted that they have a traditional
right to march, regardless of the changed demographics of the now 100%
nationalist area (over the years many of the Catholic families living here
came as refugees, having been driven from homes in mixed areas). And,
two, because the elected spokesperson for the residents, Councillor Brendan
McKenna, is a former republican prisoner. This refusal to negotiate mirrored
exactly the position also of David Trimble who until September refused to
recognize Gerry Adams party, Sinn Fein, despite an IRA ceasefire, Sinn Fein
signing the Belfast Agreement, and the party having 18 members elected to
the 108-seat Assembly.
To take its seats in the Assembly Sinn Fein took the radical step of ending
the partys 7D-year-old policy of abstentionism, leading to accusations from a
small number of dissident republicans, some of whom had split from the
IRA, that Sinn Fein had sold out traditional republican principles. These
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dissidents called themselves the Real IRA. They were formed after a secret
IRA Convention in October 1997 (specially called at the behest of the critics
of the peace process) at which they were defeated by a maJority of delegates
who opted to support the leaderships direction and keep the guns quiet.
This minority split away and by mid-1998 they were car-bombing small
towns throughout the North, mostly from bases in the South. Sinn Fein
countered their criticisms by stating that its approach was m fact the more
revolutionary one and reflected an increasing confidence among the
nationalist community which makes up 40% of the population in the North.
The Assembly held its first meeting on July 1st and elected David Trimble
as First Minister and as his deputy, Seamus Mallon of the nationalist Social
Democratic and Labour Party, the SDLP (wh1ch got six seats more than Sinn
Fein). Sinn Feins strength entitles it to two seats on the Executive but before
the make-up of the Executive was decided the Assembly went into recess,
just before the Drumcree siege.
In the early hours of Sunday morning, 12 July, loyalists petrol-bombed the
working-class home of 29-year-old Christine Quinn, a Catholic, in
Ballymoney, a town about 30 miles north of Belfast. Her three children,
Richard (11}, Mark (10) and Jason (9) were burned to death. There was
immediate public revulsion but still the Orangemen at Drumcree refused to
call a halt to their siege of Garvaghy Road, and even tried to rumour that the
deaths were carried out by a relative of Chnssie Quinn and had nothing to
do with them. Their spokesperson, David Jones, then claimed that the RUC
had put some loyalists up to carrying out the petrol-bombing in order to
discredit the siege!
That Sunday afternoon a chaplain for the Orange Order, the Reverend
William Bingham, declared from the pulpit of his church that a fifteen
minute walk down Garvaghy Road would be a very hollow victory because
it would be in the shadow of three coffins. He said that Orangeman should
go home. Across the world the Orangemen were condemned. Even
newspapers in Britain normally sympathetic to their cause began to question
the cost of the Union and whether it was worth it. On Monday the Belfast
nationalist paper, the Irish News, caught the forlorn mood of the times. On
its front page, under the photographs of the children, it reproduced
Ruckert's poem Kindertotenlieder (Songs on the Death of Children):
In this weather, in this storm,
I would never have sent the children out;
Someone took them out,
I could have no say in it.
In this weather, in this turmoil,
I would never have let the children go out;
I would have been afraid they might be hurt,
Now these are idle thoughts.
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In this weather, in this horror,
I would never have let the children go out,
I was worried they might die the next day,
That is now not a thing to worry about.
In this weather, in this storm,
I would never have send the children out;
Someone took them out,
I could have no say in it.
In this weather, in this turmoil, in this storm,
They rest as if in their mothers house,
Not frightened by any storm,
Protected by the hand of God.

Though sporadic violence continued for another two nights the numbers on
the hillside decreased. At some parades on the following Monday
Orangemen openly shouted disagreements at each other, with the Reverend
William Bingham being physically attacked and thrown into a ditch. The
Orange Order was in disarray. The RUC and British army occupied the
hillside, made arrests and recovered weapons and explosive devices, and
effectively ended the occupation.
The immediate political fall-out of the deaths of the three children was to
cause a lot of soul-searching among Orangemen and unionists, and
appeared to strengthen the hand of supporters of the Agreement, and, in
particular, strengthen the leadership of David Trimble against extremists
from within his own party and without. One week before the burning to
death of the children, the Orangemen at Drumcree had planned to muster
100,000 people on that hillside to force the British government to capitulate.
A few days later the fields were empty and it seemed that we had all been
given another chance.
Then came Omagh.
At ten past three, on Saturday, 15th August, a car bomb exploded in the
main street of Omagh (70 miles from Belfast), killing 29 men, women and
children and severely injuring scores of others. It was the worse single
incident in the Troubles. It was an act of violence so beyond-the-rules of any
conceivable perception of legitimate engagement, and so out of tune with
the desire of the Irish nation for peace, that Gerry Adams condemned it
without reservation. Up until Omagh Sinn Fein representatives had
steadfastly refused to use the word condemn, not only because of its
association with the hypocritical double-standards of unionist and British
politicians who refuse to condemn British violence, but because Sinn Fein
had viewed armed struggle as a legitimate response to the British presence
and to British interference. Sinn Fein was now signalling the primacy of
politics over armed struggle and, indeed, a few weeks later Gerry Adams
intimated that the war was over when he said that violence must now be a
thing of the past, over, done with, gone.
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So outraged by Omagh was the public and so intense was public pressure
on the anything but Real IRA that within a week it called a total ceasefire.
London and Dublin had reacted swiftly with amendments to the emergency
laws making conviction on membership charges easier to obtain (a draconian
measure, actually in breach of the spirit of the Belfast Agreement).
Furthermore, the dissident republicans frantically contacted the media to
claim that they had been threatened by the Provisional IRA (that is, the real
IRA) that they would be dealt with if they didnt ceasefire. Shortly,
afterwards, the LVF and the Irish National Liberation Army also declared
ceasefires, leaving the ineffectual Continuity IRA (associated with Republican
Sinn Fein which split from Sinn Fein in 1986) the only group not on
ceasefire.
One would have thought that circumstances could not have been more
propitious for political progress. But then, in September, David Trimble,
created a full-scale crisis when he once again placed all emphasis on IRA
decommissioning, or, in its absence, that Sinn Fein not be allowed to sit on
the future Executive. Certainly, Trimble remains under pressure from his
own party dissidents. And the Orange Order and Paisley continually accuse
him of being prepared to sit with Sinn Fein in government while the IRA
holds on to its arsenal of explosives and guns (which it shipped from Libya
in the late eighties).
There is no doubt that the IRA inflicted heavy suffering on the unionist
community and that unionist anger is genuine. On the issue of prison
releases the unionist parties and much of the media have tended to
concentrate on IRA prisoners and the anger and dismay their release will
cause to the relatives of those whose loved ones were killed. What is
completely ignored, of course, is that in the case of over four hundred
nationalist families in the North they will never even be in the position to
experience such anger and dismay because the people who killed their loved
ones - these people being members of the RUC and British army -never
served a day in prison in the first place, and they have been and still are
protected by those politicians shouting loudest. Another fear opponents of
the process have raised is the prospect of all these prisoners rejoining an
intact, heavily armed IRA. But over thirty years, even when the jails were
full, there was never a time when the IRA failed to recruit. The unionists
either cannot see or choose not to see that the IRA has a will to peace.
Back in the 1960s the IRA split and the Provisional IRA was formed partly
because its leadership had decommissioned the majority of the organizations
weapons, leaving the nationalist community virtually undefended when the
pogroms of August 1969 were unleashed by unionist supporters helped by
considerable numbers of RUC men, and Catholics were burned out of their
homes, their churches and schools destroyed. IRA decommissioning, in
republican eyes, is synonymous with surrendering, yet as far as the IRA is
concerned it may not have won the war but it certainly did not lose it either.
Perhaps the only circumstances in which the IRA might decommission are
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those where certain conditions prevail. There would need to be institutions
in place in which nationalists had confidence. A new police service - not the
RUC - representative of both communities would need to be established.
And, finally, nationalists would have to feel secure and free from the types
of sectarian attacks to which they have been subjected, not just this year, but
throughout the history of the Northern Ireland state.
At the time of writing, in addition to the row over decommissioning, no
Executive has been formed, and the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists cannot
agree which areas should come under the authority of the cross-border
bodies.
Saturday, August 22nd, in Belfast was sunny but unseasonably chilly weather consistent with one of the worse summers we ever had, though
summer had started out promising, as promising as the political climate
which saw the historic breakthrough in the talks, the Agreement, and
popular support for the Referenda. On that day I walked to St Peters ProCathedral to take part in a Vigil of Prayer, like thousands of others across
Ireland, in memory of the Omagh victims: an eighteen-month-old baby, a
twenty-month-old baby, an eight-year-old girl, a twelve-year-old boy, two
Spanish teenagers, a sixty-five-year-old woman ... A candle was lit for each
person, and two roses were laid for the unborn infants of Mrs Avril
Monaghan, eight-months pregnant, whose daughter and mother also died.
I thought to myself: the days of intransigence, the days of bombast, the
days of bombing are over. But it is shameful that we shall live on the backs
of the dead. Not just one killed, not just three, not just four, but an
unconscionable toll ... Hopefully, it will all look slightly different through the
prism of time, and there will come a time when there will not be red, when
there will not be black, the colours of blood and despair, but there will be
blue, the blue skies of peace.
Dear Future ...
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